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Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, 
phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the 
asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble 
containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I 
argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere 
poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an 
ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not 
philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical 
to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, 
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LEVINAS AND THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY: AN ETHICAL APPROACH 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Emmanuel Levinas opens the preface to his Totality and Infinity with a question, which in a post-
Auschwitz world, he claims is of ‘the highest importance’ – have we been ‘duped by morality’?i The 
question I shall be addressing in this paper is whether or not we have been ‘duped’ by Levinas’ thought 
– that is, why call it philosophy? Levinas claims to be discussing a relation of which we can never have 
knowledge, that is beyond phenomenological description, beyond or prior to time and prior to the very 
definition of the ontological self. In short, an event which is not an event, of which there neither is nor 
ever could be any ‘evidence’, but only traces left behind, gaps in our ontology that ‘point’ to a 
transcendental ethical responsibility. Dermot Moran complains that Levinas has made an ‘apparent 
abandonment of rational argument and justification in favour of repetitive, dogmatic assertions which 
have the character of prophetic incantation and quasi-religious absolutist pronouncements’.ii Another 
commentator, Theodore De Boer, wonders if Levinas has fallen back into ‘prephilosophical opinions 
and beliefs’.iii Stephen Smith points out that as Levinas’ work is neither rational, phenomenological nor 
ontological, it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at 
all’?iv  
Smith tries to contain Levinas’ work under the banner of ‘soft reason’,v which might be thought of as 
essentially sophistic or oratorical, in the Platonic sense. The sophistic rhetoricians and orators, the users 
of ‘soft reason’, are for Plato mere persuaders and not philosophers, not lovers of wisdom searching for 
the ‘truth’ but only trying to bring about belief without knowledge, merely the ‘appearance’ of truth. In 
other words, Plato (philosophy as love of wisdom) excludes the sophists (mere persuaders) from 
philosophy proper. Are we likewise to exclude the ‘sophist’ Levinas from philosophy proper? Is 
Levinas what Plato calls a ‘counterfeit philosopher’, a mere poser trying to dupe us, or is he justifiably 
a ‘true philosopher’?vi  
 
2.0 WHY CALL IT PHILOSOPHY? 
 
Levinas, in explicitly acknowledging the concern over the philosophical nature of his work, asks, in 
relation to his own work (specifically Otherwise than Being), whether his ‘discourse remain[s] then 
coherent and philosophical?’ – ‘familiar objections’vii he exclaims! We can see from such comments 
that Levinas largely considers the question of whether his work is philosophy to be a question of 
language, a concern over whether or not his discourse is sufficiently philosophically coherent. And in 
so formulating and understanding such ‘familiar objections’, Levinas implicitly transforms the question 
from, ‘why call it philosophy?’, into the linguistic formulation, ‘is the discourse philosophical?’ In a 
published dialogue with Richard Kearney, Levinas states:  
 
For me the essential characteristic of philosophy is a certain, specifically Greek, way of thinking and 
speaking. Philosophy is primarily a question of language; and it is by identifying the subtextual language 
of particular discourses that we can decide whether they are philosophical or not. Philosophy employs a 
series of terms and concepts – such as morphe (form), ousia (substance), nous (reason), logos (thought) 
or telos (goal) etc. – that constitute a specifically Greek lexicon of intelligibility.viii  
 
In this passage Levinas implies that philosophy is primarily (or ‘in essence’) characterised through its 
employment of a specifically Greek lexicon of intelligibility.  Hence, assessing whether or not Levinas’ 
work is ‘philosophy’ becomes for Levinas primarily a matter of identifying whether the subtextual 
language of the discourse is relevantly philosophical. Clearly, there are certain terms which Levinas 
employs, such as ‘reason’, ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘transcendence’ and so on, which belong to a 
specifically Greek philosophical lexicon of intelligibility. However, while the employment of such a 
lexicon may arguably be a necessary condition for calling a discourse ‘philosophy’, it is at least 
certainly not a sufficient condition. Evidently the philosophical tradition implies more than just the 
simple employment of various key terms; it also includes an implicit world-picture, a certain way of 
approaching the world, a certain manner of thinking and thinking-about things. Indeed, as Wittgenstein 
has stressed, our language literally forces us into a certain way of thinking about the world.ix Thus, by 
employing a certain specifically Greek language we are committed to a certain specifically Greek way 
of thinking about the world and, consequently, a certain specifically Greek understanding of what does 




perhaps the most essential distinguishing feature of the language of Greek philosophy was its equation of 
truth with an intelligibility of presence...truth to be that which is present...which can be gathered...into a 
totality that we would call the world or cosmos…To equate the truth with presence is to presume that 
however different the two terms of the relation appear...they can be ultimately rendered…the same.x 
But if Levinas equates philosophy with a Greek way of thinking, a thinking which reduces everything 
to the sphere of the same, to an ontology of presence, how can his own thought, which aims to 
transcend such limitations, still be called philosophy? Levinas responds to this challenge as follows:   
 
But although philosophy is essentially Greek, it is not exclusively so...What we term the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition…proposed an alternative approach to meaning and truth…The difficulty is, of course, to speak 
of this alternative tradition, given the essentially Greek nature of philosophical language.xi 
 
For Levinas, what is missed out by the Greek language, but which is still nevertheless a source of 
wisdom, is the ethical which transcends the ontological. This implies, then, that there is a ‘dual origin 
of meaning’,xii which can be found in both the Greek and non-Greek (or ‘Judaeo-Christian’) traditions 
and lexicons; that is, as Levinas puts it, ‘philosophy can be ethical as well as ontological, can be at 
once Greek and non-Greek in its inspiration’.xiii I do not think we should read Levinas here as claiming 
that when philosophy’s speaks it can somehow transcend the Said. That is, in Oona Ajzenstat’s terms, 
philosophy (and Levinas too) must necessarily ‘betray’ otherness in its Said,xiv but nonetheless 
philosophy can still be (to use Levinas’ term) ‘inspired’ by an ethics it can never re-present in 
language. This inspiration ought to lead philosophy into trying to minimise that betrayal, to deconstruct 
itself in order to undermine itself, to recognise its own fragility and leave open the possibility for 
genuine difference through a commitment to defining itself in terms that avoid, what Ajzenstat calls, 
‘totalities’ the ‘tendency to claim finality’.xv Claims to finality are an endorsement of status quo 
sameness and a closed door to otherness.   
But, of course, in exploring that which is beyond ontology, in approaching the ethical demand which is 
never present, we face a difficulty that Levinas himself acknowledges in the preface to his Totality and 
Infinity. Here Levinas writes: ‘And is not philosophy itself after all defined as an endeavour to live a 
life beginning in evidence, opposing the opinions of one’s fellow-men, the illusions and caprice of 
one’s own subjectivity?’xvi Indeed it would seem to be the case that Levinas’ work, which lies outside 
the very possibilities of evidence, must then only ‘live on subjective opinions and illusions’.xvii But this 
would only be the case: 
 
Unless the philosophical evidence refers from itself to a situation that can no longer be stated in terms of 
‘totality’…We can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a 
situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a situation is…transcendence in the face of the Other.xviii 
 
Consequently, in order for Levinas to claim that his work is philosophy, he must show wisdom to be 
broader than merely the totality of ontology that comprises knowledge. Thus, in order to remain 
philosophical whilst going beyond Being and so also beyond the very possibility of phenomenological 
evidence, Levinas must show how the totality of ontology ‘breaks up’, how ethics disrupts ontology 
and how the Greek lexicon necessarily points to ‘the ethical or biblical perspective that transcends’ it.xix  
 
3.0 THE CONTAINER METAPHOR 
 
The standard approach to defining philosophy has traditionally been to forward a proposition (or 
perhaps a small set of propositions) as to what philosophy is; i.e. philosophy is…the love of 
wisdom/the search for truth/the meaning of Being/the use of a Greek lexicon of intelligibility etc and 
that’s it.  This approach to defining philosophy is governed by what I shall refer to as the container 
metaphor. The container metaphor approach involves the desire to enclose philosophy in a water-tight 
container. That is, philosophy is to be defined once and for all, finally and completely, in terms of a 
proposition or set of propositions which form a container, or fenced enclosure, in which the 
philosopher resides and the poser/sophist/counterfeiter is excluded.  
 
The overwhelming political dominance of this approach to defining philosophy has been so great that 
its domination has gone largely unchallenged. Many of the great philosophers have at times attempted 
such a container definition and, further, their tendency has been to define ‘philosophy’ is such a way 
such that their work or approach to philosophy becomes the very paradigmatic example of what 
philosophy is (or rather, ought to be). And this is inevitably the case with all approaches which work 
within the container metaphor, as one simply cannot saw off the philosophical branch one sits upon 
(although some may wish to throw away the ladder). That is, one naturally defines philosophy in such a 
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way so that one’s own philosophical work becomes the paradigmatic example of what philosophy is, 
simply because if one had thought philosophy was something else then one’s philosophical work would 
have been something else.  
 
The container metaphor thus implies an approach where the (great) philosopher attempts to define the 
identity of philosophy in terms of their own self-image. And this is always, at least somewhat, a 
totalising gesture – the whole state (or philosophical discourse) is forced into a sameness with the 
leader or paradigmatic example. It is also a case of identity defined in terms of exclusionary policies – 
those that challenge or fail to meet such identity requirements, the ‘poser’ or ‘sophist’, are seen to 
challenge the collective identity of the dominant party, and, as such, are excluded on the grounds of 
political necessity. Hence we see that the task of defining ‘what philosophy is’, when governed by the 
container metaphor approach, is essentially an ontological question. It is less a concern with the 
epistemological problems of how we are to know who the posers are, and more cornered with 
ontologically defining the ‘we’, the philosophers, as opposed to the ‘posers’, the sophists.  
 
Alain Badiou comments on the violent nature of the relationship between the philosopher and the 
sophist in a short paper entitled The Definition of Philosophy. There he writes: 
 
Every philosophical process is polarized by a specific adversary, the sophist. The Sophist is externally 
(or discursively) indiscernible from the philosopher…In this sense, we can also define philosophy as the 
act by which indiscernible discourses are nevertheless opposed, or rather as what separates itself from its 
double. Philosophy is always the breaking of a mirror.xx 
 
This concern with the double, the poser who is externally indiscernible from the original, can be traced 
through Dostoevsky’s story, The Double and Poe’s tale William Wilson. In both tales the double 
appears suddenly and continually tries to undermine the original and subsume their place in society. In 
Dostoevsky’s story Mr Golyadkin’s double continually foils all the originals plans, and the story ends 
with the original Mr Golyadkin being excluded from society (driven away to where: ‘Dark forest 
loomed left and right. It was lonely and desolate’)xxi and his double fully taking his place within society 
and the economy. This is philosophy’s great fear of being usurped and replaced by the sophist. 
 
Poe’s William Wilson knows, with a vigour that Dostoevsky’s Mr Golyadkin lacks, that the only way 
he can feel secure from the undermining of his double, the only way he can safeguard his identity, is 
through the destruction of his double. William Wilson exclaims: ‘Scoundrel! Impostor! Accursed 
villain! You shall not – you shall not dog me unto death!’xxii Here Wilson vents what Badiou calls the 
‘desire to finish with the sophist once and for all’.xxiii The only way Wilson can rid himself of his 
impostor, his poser, is through violence. Thus Wilson stabs his double, but as he looks into a mirror, he 
finds he has stabbed himself. As Wilson lies dying his double says to him: ‘In me didst thou exist – 
and, in my death, see by this image, which is thine own, how utterly thou hast murdered thyself.’xxiv 
 
The purely ontological approach to the definition of philosophy implied by the container metaphor 
inevitably leads to the desire to kill off the sophist double who challenges the originals (philosophy’s) 
sense of self and their place in society and the economy. That is, it creates the desire (or need) to 
rigidly define philosophy once and for all so that the external world will no longer confuse the 
philosopher with the indiscernible sophist. This violent need to silence a difference that does not 
conform to our definition of sameness and identity can be seen in Hume’s fiery conclusion to his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where he writes:  
 
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any 
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it 
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.xxv 
 
Hume, in his desire to rid the world of the sophist, the poser, those who do not fit in with his 
conclusions as to what is to be allowed into or contained within the ‘real’ realms of philosophy, are to 
be got rid of in the flames of a good old fashioned book burning – indeed, burning being the only Final 
Solution, the only way to once and for all silence one’s opponent. 
 
Therefore, it seems that the container metaphor approach to defining philosophy is inevitably unethical 
and violent. It seeks to undermine its opposition and assert its own universal supremacy and 
domination on all who can be called philosophers. Rather than endorsing this approach implicitly by 
working within its confines, I shall instead consider an ethical alternative. Badiou writes that: ‘The 
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ethics of philosophy, which wards of disaster, consists entirely in a constant reserve with regard to its 
sophistic double, a reserve that allows philosophy to remove itself from the temptation of dividing 
itself.’xxvi However, philosophy’s killing of its double is not only unethical, in that embodies a 
container approach where philosophy is defined only at the expense of the excluded double, but, as 
Poe’s Wilson makes clear, suicidal. The reason that this is so is because in the  killing or burning of the 
double philosophy permits and endorses unnecessary and unjustified violence - and it is the reign of 
violence which alone, I shall argue, fundamentally undermines the very possibility of the existence of 
philosophy. Thus it is only an ethical approach to the definition of philosophy that can save philosophy 
from doing violence to the poser, and thus violence also to itself.   
 
4.0 AN ETHICAL DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY AS SOCIALITY 
 
While philosophy has traditionally taken an unethical container approach to the task of defining itself, 
it arguably need not. Indeed Levinas’ own thought provides us with the tools to develop an ethical 
alternative. Levinas exposes the totality of ontology as made incomplete by, and dependent on, the 
ethical which transcends it. Rather than reduce the otherness of the Other to the sphere of the same, 
Levinas shows how, by equating the epiphany of the face with the Cartesian idea of infinity, the alterity 
of the Other overflows or transcends all boundaries of totality and finitude. The ethical Saying, which 
can never be re-presented, is a transcendence of the ontological Said, in which it is nevertheless always 
present as a trace. In other words, the infinity of the face is that which overflows all possible 
containers, just as the Saying is an openness that exceeds the finality of all possible containers. And 
while we can think of defining philosophy in such a way so as to be able to ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, 
by accepting a broader account of wisdom as containing both ontology and ethics, this replacement of 
the old container by a slightly bigger one, while it may do justice to Levinas’ work,  is nevertheless 
arguably unethical. Rather, I propose, we can see in Levinas’ thought, through its idea of an ethics that 
cannot be reduced to a finite container, a fundamental challenge to such an approach.  
 
But how can we ethically define philosophy? Is it even possible? What is required is a new governing 
metaphor for the task of defining philosophy and not a bigger container. The ethical metaphor I 
propose is the metaphor of sociality. In a dialogue with Richard Kearney, Levinas states: 
 
The fact that philosophy cannot fully totalize the alterity of meaning in some final presence or 
simultaneity is not for me a deficiency or fault. Or to put it another way, the best thing about philosophy 
is that it fails. It is better that philosophy fail to totalize meaning – even though, as ontology, it has 
attempted just this – for it thereby remains open to the irreducible otherness of transcendence. Greek 
ontology…expressed the strong sentiments that the last word is unity, the many becoming one…Man’s 
relationship with the other is better as difference than unity: sociality is better than fusion.xxvii 
 
Rather than trying to ‘call it philosophy’ by containing it within philosophy, by reducing it to a 
sameness, might it not be more ethical to instead take an approach which maintains an openness – thus 
to conceive of philosophy as a fluid sociality rather than a fixed container. To repeat Levinas: ‘sociality 
is better [i.e. more ethical] than fusion’. 
 
The metaphor of sociality implies a broadness, a conversation, a discourse and an openness. It is an 
approach that not does seek ontological presence but ethical proximity. Philosophy is thus envisaged as 
a communal practise, fundamentally rooted in sociality. Sociality implies openness, a Saying, a 
dialogue, as well as the ethics and justice that necessarily founds community and sustains, and makes 
possible, the discourse of one speaking to, or with, another. The ethical openness of philosophy as 
sociality challenges the ontological and spatial metaphors of philosophy as a closed container. For 
Socrates, philosophy is above all else a way of life, a way of living, a dynamic engagement in the form 
of dialogue or sociality with others. In his Apology, Socrates proclaims: ‘discussing goodness and all 
the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the 
very best thing a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living.’xxviii The 
term ‘discussion’ is important in the above quote. In The Protagoras we find this elucidation of the 
term: ‘Let your conversation be a discussion not a dispute. A discussion is carried on among friends 
with goodwill, but a dispute is between rivals and enemies’.xxix What Socrates/Plato gives us here is a 
picture of philosophy as the openness of dialogue, as the sociality of engagement with community, 
founded on goodwill and friendship, for the sake of examination and discussion. Philosophy is thus 
envisaged not as an abstract container, but as an actual, vibrant and evolving sociality of peoples 
engaged in philosophical discussion. This approach does not merge into violent repression of the 
double, because it is comfortable in a self-identity that is not dominated by any particular image. 
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Indeed it recognises it needs difference, it needs Other in order to engage in external discussion, not 
just internal meditation. As a communal activity it relies on an ethics of engagement that must underlie 
any social interaction. And it is only when this ethical engagement has been ratified that the way 
becomes open for the discussion of ontology to commence; that is, to re-use Levinas’ phrase, ethics 
precedes ontology. 
 
My definition of sociality has much in common with Hannah Arendt discussion of the Greek polis.xxx 
Arendt writes that: 
 
for the Greeks the essence of friendship consisted in discourse. They [the Greeks] held that only constant 
interchange of talk united citizens in a polis. In discourse the political importance of friendship, and the 
humanness peculiar to it, were made manifest.xxxi 
 
That is, the sociality metaphor implies an approach to defining philosophy based on friendship within a 
polis, not the totalising definition of a new realm in which all must conform in order to be granted 
access. Arendt defines the polis as the place of true equality and freedom – where freedom means 
freedom from necessity, and thus to be free from ruling (like a tyrant) and being ruled (like a slave or 
one in bad health and tyrannised by illness). The polis is where equals engage in discussions and use 
persuasion, not violence. Violence, and thus violent definitions, are incompatible with the polis so 
conceived. Likewise all open discussions, including a philosophy defined in terms of the sociality 
metaphor, require above all else a non-violent opening, a place where equals can safely engage in 
discussion based on goodwill, and where an ethical openness is vigilantly maintained in order to allow 
and welcome the Other to enter into discourse.  Philosophy ought to seek not to define itself as a 
totalising regime looking for fusion and sameness under a single, constant and eternal banner, but 
should seek to maintain a place of goodwill and welcoming, based on a sociality of openness and non-
violence.  
 
It is not the poser, as the container metaphors thinks, but violence, that will destroy philosophy once 
and for all. Arendt argues that: 
 
Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration camps of totalitarian regimes, not 
only the laws…but everything and everybody must fall silent…Violence itself is incapable of speech, 
and not merely that speech is helpless when confronted with violence.xxxii 
 
Violence induces and enforces silence, and thus it is violence alone that can destroy the very possibility 
of sociality and thus philosophy. That is, violence is unsociability par excellence.  There can be no 
open discussion based on goodwill in a realm governed by violence. It is for this very reason that 
philosophy’s violent obsession to burn the sophist, to be done with them once and for all, is suicidal. 
For by endorsing and allowing violence into philosophical practise, philosophy commits suicide by 
endorsing that which contradicts its own preconditions for existence.  
 
However, violence itself is not intrinsically unethical, but rather becomes so when it is used in a way 
such that its ends do not justify its means. For example, burning the sophist because he says things 
which contradict our definition of philosophy is a use of violence that is clearly unethical. But to never 
use violence would amount to bystander apathy and the inability to engage in justified self-defence.  As 
Arendt notes: 
 
Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate. Its justification loses in plausibility the farther 
its intended end recedes into the future. No one questions the use of violence in self-defence, because the 
danger is not only clear but also present, the end justifying the means is immediate.xxxiii 
 
In other words, sometimes ‘violence is the only way of ensuring a hearing for moderation’.xxxiv In order 
for philosophy to maintain a space where philosophical discourse can survive, it is ethically obliged 
and justified to use (non-legitimate) violence, if absolutely necessary, to exclude that which is violent 
from disrupting an open discourse based on goodwill – that is, to ensure the possibility of the survival 
of philosophy.  As Derrida puts it, sometimes violence must be used, but only to ‘avoid the worst 
violence, the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse’xxxv – philosophy can exist 
only in the light of an opening, and not in the silence of darkness.  
 
In 1934, hardly a year after Hitler’s rise to power, Levinas wrote an article entitled Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism.xxxvi Levinas wrote a preface to that article, when it was later reprinted, in 
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which he claimed to regret having ‘dignified’ Hitlerism with the name of a ‘philosophy’. This raises the 
question of whether the ‘openness’ of the sociality metaphor has sufficient force to exclude Hitlerism 
as legitimate philosophy? Is an ethical definition of philosophy too open? Levinas, in his 1934 paper, 
according to Robert Manning’s reading, claims that: ‘the philosophy of Hitlerism, the biological 
conception of man, the Germanic ideal, can be expressed short hand in the term racism, and racism has 
its own particular way of spreading: violence and war and conquest.’xxxvii Thus we can see that Levinas 
identifies violence as the very essence of Hitlerism. As such, as an idea it is a violent affront to the 
openness to discourse, the freedom from imposed silence that philosophy requires to live and flourish. 
As such, by employing the sociality metaphor as governing the task of defining philosophy, we have 
the ethical right, on the basis of self-defence and the bystander obligation to maintain a space of 
openness, to exclude Hitlerism as a discourse able to be referred to as ‘philosophy’. That is, while it 
may be, in general, violent to exclude and silence, when it comes to ideas that are intrinsically violent, 
we are justified in excluding on the basis of self-defence – to do nothing would only result in a burning, 
in a Holocaust. Hitlerism is not philosophy because it does not engage in a sociality of open discourse 
with philosophy – it dictates, its proclaims, it is not open to opposition, and the possibility of other 
positions. It wants total silence and sameness. It is in principle unsociable and against the very 
possibility of sociality, of spontaneity and difference existing anywhere. Thus, in this sense, Hitlerism 
it is not and cannot be philosophy. 
 
5.0 WITTGENSTEIN AND THE STRENGTH OF A THREAD 
 
Wittgenstein argues that some terms, when we ‘look and see’ what actual uses fall under that term, 
have many similarities that crop up and then disappear. That is: ‘we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail….I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family 
resemblance’.’xxxviii Might we not think of philosophy in terms of family resemblance? However a 
problem inevitably arises (in the context of this paper) as Wittgenstein’s method, in itself, is too 
passive – it simply wants to ‘look and see’ and does not want to actually judge what we ought and 
ought not call philosophy. Further, it is concerned with seeing how we use words now, and hence is not 
much use in helping us to decide how to classify potentially new instances of a term, or even how we 
might reform or change our usage.  
 
Nonetheless, I think some use can be made of Wittgenstein’s idea here, provided we govern the 
concept with the appropriate metaphor. The ‘family resemblance’ approach can be governed by either 
the container or sociality metaphor approaches. If we think of a family as just another type of container, 
defined by a set of propositions that stipulate what philosophy is once and for all, then this approach 
will suffer from the unethical features common to all closed containers. However, if we govern our 
usage of the family resemblance concept, when we come to define philosophy, with the sociality 
metaphor, then we can generate a series of propositions or definitions (fibres to use Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor)xxxix as to what philosophy is and which we can weave into a thread we call ‘philosophy’, 
whilst at the same time maintaining that the family must remain ethically open-ended or non-final. That 
is, we ought never tie the thread off, once and for all, or close off the possibility of the addition of a 
new fibre to, or even the removal of an old fibre from, our thread. In this sense of an open-ended 
dynamic thread, there would be no single totalising essence of sameness to philosophy, no single fibre 
that runs through the entire thread that all must conform to, nor a finality or closure, but only a 
perpetual ethical openness to expansion (or contraction). Therefore I propose we might use the concept 
of family resemblance, when governed by the sociality metaphor, as a method to ethically define what 




I have been attempting, by re-thinking the question of why we call something philosophical, to avoid 
the old standstill that either we accept Levinas’ ‘prophetic appeal’,xli  in which case we find his 
incoherence coherent and therefore find his work philosophical, or we don’t accept its appeal, in which 
case we seemed left with nothing much that deserves or merits being called philosophical. However, I 
have not been arguing that philosophy can avoid totalising, in other words, that its betrayal of otherness 
is not necessary, but only that philosophy can totalise either ethically or unethically. It does so 
unethically when it takes the container approach and makes absolute claims to finality, whereby it 
excludes, almost a priori, all dissenters through an unjustified and illegitimate violent silencing of 
difference. It can do so ethically if it maintains an openness, if it makes a virtue of its fragility and 
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purposefully refrains from claims of finality that would dislodge the possibility of a challenge to its 
sameness and instead thinks about itself in terms of the notions of sociality and family resemblance. 
Thus we can use this approach  to repose our questions about the philosophical nature of Levinas’ 
discourse. We need not ask whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, or reduce it to an 
either/or question of whether or not we accept Levinas’ ‘appeal’. Instead we can ask: can we find a 
home for Levinas’ thought as a thread in the fibre of philosophy? Does Levinas’ thought enjoy a 
sociality of open engagement with philosophical thought? Does Levinas’ thought remain non-violent, 
in the sense of entering and maintaining a non-violent opening, a place where philosophical discourse 
based on goodwill can exist and flourish? Does it remain open to the possibilities of Other, of plurality 
and difference? Is it, in principle, philosophically sociable? The answers to all these questions, and 
ones like them, must be a resounding yes. Levinas’ thought not only engages and confronts, but 
challenges many of our core philosophical positions. Thus we can, regardless of whether or not we 
accept Levinas’ thought as ‘correct’, still indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy; we can 
surely find a space in philosophy for his voice to be heard, whether or not we agree with it. While we 
may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I have 
shown that this is no reason to exclude him as a poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on 
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